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The Fourth Amendment Implications on
the Real-Time Tracking of Cell Phones
Through the Use of “Stingrays”
W. Scott Kim*
The rights secured to us by the Fourth Amendment were the driving
force behind the American Revolution. Today, law enforcement seems to
forget that fact when they use cell-site simulators, commonly referred to
by the brand name “Stingray,” without first securing a warrant. These
devices mimic cell phone towers and force cell phones near them to connect to the cell-site simulator instead of a tower, thereby allowing the user of the simulator device to track a cell phone to its precise location.
Ninety-two percent of Americans own a cell phone and forty-six percent of smartphone users say they could not go a single day without them.
Cell phones are not just another modern convenience, they are a part of
modern life and people should not have to sacrifice a near necessity in
today’s world in order to secure their privacy. This Note analyzes the
conflict between the Fourth Amendment and the use of cell-site simulator
technology and argues that the use of a Stingray constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search and should require a warrant prior to its use.
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INTRODUCTION
Cell phone users know that when making a call from their cell
phone, the phone has to connect to a cell tower.1 They are also
aware that they are conveying their cell tower location to their service provider, who may then give it to a law enforcement agency to
track them.2 What they do not know is that their cell phone may
not be connecting to a cell tower at all, but instead to a device
known as a “cell-site simulator,” commonly referred to by the
brand name “Stingray.”3 These devices send out signals of their
own and force cell phones in the area to transfer their locations and
identifying information to it instead of a cell tower, all without ever
alerting the user of the phone.4 With these devices, the government
can determine at what time and to whom you are calling each time
you place a call, the location of every phone in the area, and with
certain devices, even listen in on your conversations and texts.5
Law enforcement agencies typically use Stingrays in three
ways: (1) to find an individual whose cell phone number they have
in order to determine his location;6 (2) to follow an individual
whose cell phone number they do not have to various locations in
order to analyze the numbers at each location and determine the
targeted individual’s number;7 or (3) to capture the cell phone data

1

See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 510 (11th Cir. 2015).
See id.
3
See Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them
[https://perma.cc/C85Q-SPPX] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Who’s Got
Them].
4
Id.
5
Hanni Fakhoury & Trevor Timm, Stingrays: The Biggest Technological Threat to Cell
Phone Privacy You Don’t Know About, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/stingrays-biggest-unknown-technologicalthreat-cell-phone-privacy [https://perma.cc/SYR4-529T]; see also Dina Rasour, Protesters
Beware: Don’t Get Stung by Stingrays, OCCUPY.COM (Sept. 17, 2014),
http://www.occupy.com/article/protesters-beware-don%E2%80%99t-get-stung-stingrays
[https://perma.cc/RC7Q-VB74].
6
See Larry Greenemeier, What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance?,
SCI. AM. (June 25, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-bigsecret-surrounding-stingray-surveillance/?page=1[https://perma.cc/48CA-NLAA].
7
See id.
2
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of everyone in attendance at rallies and protests.8 Law enforcement’s use of a Stingray typically begins with them driving around
from place to place with the device in order to narrow in on the target cell phone’s location by gathering the phone’s signal strength at
each point, resulting in a far more precise location than what could
have been ascertained from cell tower records.9 This process can
lead law enforcement right to the doorstep of the phone’s location,
allowing law enforcement to switch to a handheld Stingray if necessary to walk through the building and hone in on the exact room
where the target phone is located.10
However, even in those situations where law enforcement is
only trying to locate one particular person, Stingrays do not only
collect the data of the target.11 Rather, they collect the data from
every single phone near it, within a range of several kilometers, by
making each phone connect to it every seven to fifteen seconds.12
This means potentially thousands of innocent people’s phones
could be searched with no one but law enforcement knowing about
it.13 The safety of a person’s home will not stop a Stingray either,
as the device is able to track the location of a cell phone through
walls.14
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released a new policy on
the use of Stingrays for federal officers in September 201515 but at
least sixty-one law enforcement agencies in twenty-three states,
plus the District of Columbia, also have Stingrays and most use
8

See id.
Kim Zetter, The Feds Are Now Using ‘Stingrays’ in Planes to Spy on Our Phone Calls,
WIRED (Nov. 14, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/feds-motherfngstingrays-motherfng-planes/ [https://perma.cc/UZE9-PWNA].
10
See id.
11
See Fakhoury & Timm, supra note 5; Timothy Williams, Covert Electronic
Surveillance Prompts Calls for Transparency, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/us/stingray-covert-electronic-surveillanceprompts-calls-for-transparency.html [https://perma.cc/J4AS-RYGC].
12
See Fakhoury & Timm, supra note 5; Rasour, supra note 5.
13
See Fakhoury & Timm, supra note 5.
14
See Stingrays, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION VA. (Oct. 2014), http://acluva.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/140905-Stingray-one-pager.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F22NQ8KN].
15
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICY GUIDANCE: USE OF CELLSITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/
download [https://perma.cc/7N4A-V22M] [hereinafter DOJ Policy].
9
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them without any policy guidelines or statutes in place instructing
law enforcement on how to use the devices in compliance with the
Fourth Amendment.16 This is where the problem lies—should law
enforcement agencies be able to use Stingrays without at least obtaining a warrant first? Part I provides a background on the political
landscape today. Part II discusses the evolution of the Fourth
Amendment. Part III conducts an analysis on the use of a Stingray
in the context of the Fourth Amendment. Lastly, Part IV provides
a recommendation on the use of Stingrays in the future.
I. THE CURRENT USE OF STINGRAYS
This Part discusses how Stingrays are being used in present
day. Section I.A explains the history behind the development and
use of the Stingray. Section I.B examines the new federal policies in
place. Section I.C discusses Stingray use at the state level. Lastly,
Section I.D focuses on the differences between a Stingray and pen
register, and the issue this presents.
A. A History on the Use of Stingrays
Originally created for the military and spy agencies,17 Federal
and state agencies began using cellular surveillance techniques as
early as the 1990s. It is impossible to know the exact beginning of
their use due to the secret nature of the devices, but the first indication of use by federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence agencies was in 1991 when they began using passive surveillance techniques.18 Devices more similar to the Stingray, which
16

See Who’s Got Them, supra note 3. Approximately eleven states have laws regarding
law enforcement’s tracking of cell phones. Brandon Ellington Patterson, Police Use This
Secret Military Snooping Gadget to Track Cell Phones. But Is It Legal?, MOTHER JONES (Apr.
4, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/03/maryland-stingrayappeals-court-opinion [https://perma.cc/D2L8-HFND]. At least five states have enacted
statutes mandating a warrant before their use. See infra notes 84–88.
17
See John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA TODAY (Dec. 8,
2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-dataspying-nsa-police/3902809/ [https://perma.cc/6ND4-G9U6].
18
See Glen L. Roberts, Who’s on the Line? Cellular Phone Interception at Its Best, FULL
DISCLOSURE (1991), http://67.225.133.110/~gbpprorg/2600/harris.txt [https://perma
.cc/TU5X-QZEP] (describing the marketing of TriggerFish devices to law enforcement
agencies at the National Technical Investigators Association conference in 1991). Passive
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were capable of active surveillance, were used by the federal government and loaned to local and state law enforcement agencies
starting as early as 1995.19
The precursor to the Stingray is generally believed to be an
IMSI Catcher developed in 1996 by Rohde & Schwarz, a German
manufacturer of radio equipment.20 It was the first purpose-built
active device capable of performing surveillance on cellphones by
forcing phones to transmit their serial number to it.21 As for the development behind the Stingray itself, which was developed by Harris Corporation (“Harris”), not much is known publicly. Harris is
the exclusive manufacturer of the Stingray and discloses no details
regarding the Stingray on its website.22 The user manual provided
with a Stingray warns that the device should only be distributed to
persons eligible under 18 U.S.C. § 2512, which includes law en-

surveillance means the device “intercepts the signals sent between nearby phones and the
wireless provider’s network. . . . [T]hey can only detect signals of nearby phones when
those phones are actually transmitting data.” Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian,
Your Secret Stingray’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell
Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 1, 9–13 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
19
See FBI FOIA Releases, EPIC v. FBI, No. 12-0667 (D.D.C.)—Fifth Release,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. 260 (Feb. 7, 2013), https://epic.org/foia/fbi/stingray/
FBI-FOIA-Release-02072013-OCR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PYF4-8PXN]
(“By
Department Order 1945-95, dated January 18, 1995 (replacing Department Order 890-80,
dated Apri1 29, 1980), the Attorney General delegated to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation the authority to approve loans of electronic surveillance equipment to state
and local law enforcement agencies for use in their investigations . . . .”). Active
surveillance means the device “works by impersonating a wireless base transceiver
station . . . the carrier-owned equipment installed at a cell tower to which cellular phones
connect—and tricking the target’s phone into connecting to it” allowing the device to
“identify nearby phones, locate them with extraordinary precision, intercept outgoing
calls and text messages, as well as block service, either to all devices in the area or to
particular devices.” Pell & Soghoian, supra note 18, at 11–12 (internal citations omitted).
20
See Daehyun Strobel, IMSI Catcher 13 (July 13, 2007) (unpublished seminar paper,
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum), https://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/attachments/
files/2011/04/imsi_catcher.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7JZ-ZPZ4]. “IMSI” is short for
International Mobile Subscriber Identity. Id. at 4.
21
See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 18, at 13–14.
22
See HARRIS CORP., http://harris.com/ [https://perma.cc/5JHC-HZ4E] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2016).
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forcement and communications service providers,23 while the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) requires local law enforcement to coordinate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) before acquiring a Stingray.24 The FBI then requires the
local agency to sign a non-disclosure agreement before acquiring a
Stingray.25 Due to all this secrecy, the earliest public indication of
the invention of the Stingray is found at the Patent and Trademark
Office when Harris trademarked the name “Stingray” in 2003.26
Despite this indication that Stingrays have been around since
2003, the use of Stingrays by law enforcement agencies did not surface until 2011, when Daniel David Rigmaiden combed through
15,000 pages of court documents in an attempt to find out how authorities located him.27 Rigmaiden undertook numerous steps to
avoid detection, including fake IDs, keeping a low public profile,
and living in the woods.28 Thus, when he was found, he suspected
the only weak link in his attempt to remain anonymous was a cellular aircard he used to connect to the Internet.29 This suspicion was
confirmed when Rigmaiden discovered that the FBI was able to
locate him precisely inside his apartment because a Stingray
tracked the aircard connected to the laptop in his apartment.30
23

See 18 U.S.C. § 2512(b) (2012); HARRIS ASSURED COMMC’NS, HARDWARE MANUAL
3 (2010), https://cryptome.org/2015/03/fcc-stingray-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/A25XJACB]. A violation under § 2512 is punishable by up to five years in prison. See § 2512(a).
24
Tim Cushing, FCC Denies It Requires Law Enforcement to Sign a Non-Disclosure
Agreement with the FBI Before Deploying Stingray Devices, TECHDIRT (Oct. 10, 2014, 1:33
PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141008/13471728772/fcc-denies-it-requireslaw-enforcement-to-sign-non-disclosure-agreement-with-fbi-before-deploying-stingraydevices.shtml [https://perma.cc/895L-4VP6].
25
See id.
26
STINGRAY, Registration No. 76,303,503.
27
See Cale Guthrie Weissman, How an Obsessive Recluse Blew the Lid Off the Secret
Technology Authorities Use to Spy on People’s Cell Phones, BUS. INSIDER (June 19, 2015, 5:04
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-daniel-rigmaiden-discovered-stingrayspying-technology-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/566D-WA5M].
28
Id.
29
See id.
30
See Response to Government’s Memorandum Regarding Law Enforcement
Privilege and Request for an Ex Parte and In Camera Hearing if Necessary at Exhibit 38,
United States v. Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. CR 08-814-PHXDGC) [hereinafter Investigative Details Report] (detailing how agents of the FBI and
U.S. Postal Inspection Service used a Stingray to track and pinpoint the signal of
Rigmaiden’s aircard after only a few hours).
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Rigmaiden was ultimately charged with various counts of tax
fraud arising from an alleged scheme he had concocted where he
filed tax returns on behalf of various people who had passed away
in order to recover the proceeds from their refunds.31 However,
without the use of the Stingray, the government would not have
been able to narrow the location of Rigmaiden’s aircard down to his
specific apartment, but instead would have gotten no closer than
knowing the aircard was in the Santa Clara/San Jose area through
the use of historical cell tower data obtained from Verizon.32 This
illustrates the massive difference a Stingray’s tracking ability can
make in a man hunt because of its ability to generate “real time data during the tracking process.”33
Prior to tracking the aircard with the Stingray, the government
obtained a “tracking warrant,” which is a search warrant issued
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
that authorizes the use of a cell-site simulator.34 Rigmaiden filed a
motion to suppress, raising several Fourth Amendment challenges,
arguing that “the warrant is not supported by probable cause, that
it lacks particularity, that the government’s searches and seizures
exceeded the warrant’s scope, and that agents executed the warrant unreasonably because they failed to comply with inventory and
return requirements.”35 The American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”), through an amicus brief, raised several issues with the
warrant as well—”that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant because the warrant authorized Verizon, not the government,
to locate the aircard, and that the warrant was misleading and incomplete because it failed adequately to describe the technology
involved in the search.”36 Ultimately, the government stipulated
arguendo for the purposes of the motion to suppress that the tracking of Rigmaiden with the device was a Fourth Amendment search

31

Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
See Investigative Details Report, supra note 30.
33
See United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800, at
*15 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2013).
34
See id. at *14; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
35
See Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800, at *14.
36
Id.
32
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and seizure.37 Despite this concession, the federal government’s
position remained that the use of a Stingray, including its use here,
is not a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.38
One potential reason for making such a concession was to prevent the disclosure of information that could have been exposed
about the use of Stingrays through discovery, pre-trial motions, and
related hearings had the government defended the Fourth
Amendment issues with use of a Stingray factually. The FBI has
always asserted that information about the use of cell-site simulators is “law enforcement sensitive” and that if such information
was made public, it could easily impair the use of this investigative
method.39 The federal government in United States v. Rigmaiden
made this exact argument.40 This shows how important it is to the
federal government to keep the cell-site simulator technology secret. Therefore, by conceding the factual argument on whether a
Stingray constitutes a Fourth Amendment search and instead making an argument at the suppression stage, there were less demand37

See Government’s Memorandum re Motion for Discovery at 1, United States v.
Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Ariz. 2012) (No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC)
[hereinafter Motion for Discovery].
38
Id. at 1 n.1 (“The United States explained in its March 11, 2011, Memorandum
Regarding Law Enforcement Privilege that Defendant does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his general location or in the cell site records he transmitted
wirelessly to Verizon. Therefore, the use of the cell-site simulator is not a search under
the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, in an attempt to simplify the analysis and to avoid
unnecessary disclosure of privileged information, the United States will no longer argue
in this case only that the aircard tracking operation was not a search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, and will instead rely on its authority under the hybrid order and
tracking warrant, Defendant’s lack of standing, and, if necessary, the agents’ good faith
reliance on these court orders.” (internal citations omitted)).
39
Affidavit of Bradley S. Morrison, SAN DIEGO CITY ATT’Y OFF. 2 (Apr. 11, 2014),
http://www.sandiego.gov/cityattorney/pdf/news/2014/nr141222c.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2K5J-JMLB].
40
See Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (“[T]he government contends that the
technology used to locate Defendant’s aircard, the manner in which the technology was
employed, and the identities of the agents who operated the equipment all constitute
sensitive law enforcement information subject to the qualified privilege recognized in
Roviaro and Van Horn.”). The court cited two cases that essentially hold that the
government can shield information about sensitive investigative techniques when a court
determines that such disclosure would not be relevant or helpful to the defense or “is
essential to a fair determination of a cause.” Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60–61
(1957); see also United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492, 1507 (11th Cir. 1986).
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ing disclosure requirements.41 This strategy reduced the likelihood
that any information would become available to the public, which
seems to be the federal government’s main concern.
It is interesting to note nonetheless that the government still
obtained a warrant in this case prior to using the Stingray.42 The
prosecutors of the case even recognized that the Supreme Court
holding that when “the government uses a device that is not in
general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant” would likely apply to law enforcement’s use of a Stingray
in Rigmaiden had they sent a signal though the walls of his apartment to locate the aircard.43 This is in opposition to the government’s position taken in their motion for discovery and the DOJ’s
2005 Guidance on Electronic Surveillance.44 Ultimately, this inconsistency became essentially a moot point at the federal level as a
result of the DOJ and Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
each releasing their respective policies on Stingrays.45 However,
whether the use of a Stingray requires a warrant remains an issue at
the state and local levels.

41

See Rigmaiden, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 990; see also United States v. Garey, No. 5:03-CR83, 2004 WL 2663023, at *4 n.7 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2004) (“[T]he reasons for requiring
disclosure of privileged information at the search warrant stage are less compelling than
those for disclosure in preparation for trial.” (citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311
(1967)).
42
See text accompanying supra note 34.
43
See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 18, at 31 n.160 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 40 (2001)).
44
See supra note 38; see also ELEC. SURVEILLANCE UNIT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL: PROCEDURES AND CASE LAW FORMS 48 (2005),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2014/10/29/elec-surmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2CC-23WE] (“The amended text of the pen/trap statute
and the limited legislative history accompanying the 2001 amendments strongly suggest
that the non-content information that passes between a cellular phone and the provider’s
tower falls into the definition of ‘dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information’
for purposes of the definitions of ‘pen register’ and ‘trap and trace device.’ A pen/trap
authorization is therefore the safest method of allowing law enforcement to collect such
transmissions directly using its own devices.”).
45
See infra Section I.B.
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B. Federal Policy on the Use of Cell-Site Simulator Technology
On September 3, 2015, the DOJ released a policy for its use of
cell-site simulators, requiring federal officers to obtain warrants
before using them and setting limits on what data can be collected
and for how long.46 Prior to this policy, the government had long
asserted that it did not need to obtain a warrant to use Stingrays,
claiming that the devices operate more like a pen register because
neither device captures the content of phone calls or messages.47
The DOJ policy provides, in pertinent parts, that information
collected by Stingrays is limited to the numbers being dialed and
the signal direction of the cell phone, as opposed to GPS data.48
The policy prohibits Stingrays from collecting the content of phone
conversations, text messages, emails, or application data.49 The
collected information must be deleted no later than thirty days after
its collection if law enforcement’s target is not known, or as soon as
the identity of the target is ascertained.50 There are exceptions for
“exigent circumstances” and “exceptional circumstances,” with
exigent being broadly defined and exceptional not defined at all.51
This new policy does not apply to state and local law enforcement
agencies or other federal agencies, unless a DOJ component is using the device “in support of other federal agencies and/or state
and local law enforcement agencies.”52 Simply put, the policy only
46

See DOJ POLICY, supra note 15.
See Kim Zetter, Florida Cops’ Secret Weapon: Warrantless Cellphone Tracking, WIRED
(Mar. 3, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/stingray/ [https://perma.cc/
5KPF-GL4M]. The Supreme Court held that use of a pen register is not a Fourth
Amendment search. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
48
See DOJ Policy, supra note 15, at 2.
49
See id.
50
See id. at 6.
51
Compare id. at 3 (“An exigency that excuses the need to obtain a warrant may arise
when the needs of law enforcement are so compelling that they render a warrantless
search objectively reasonable. When an officer has the requisite probable cause, a variety
of types of exigent circumstances may justify dispensing with a warrant. These include
the need to protect human life or avert serious injury; the prevention of the imminent
destruction of evidence; the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; or the prevention of escape by a
suspect or convicted fugitive from justice.”), with id. at 4 (“There may also be other
circumstances in which, although exigent circumstances do not exist, the law does not
require a search warrant and circumstances make obtaining a search warrant
impracticable.”).
52
Id. at 6.
47
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applies to federal law enforcement and situations such as task
forces where federal and local agencies share resources.53
A little over a month after the DOJ released its policy, the DHS
also released a policy providing similar guidelines on the use of
Stingrays.54 It applies to the DHS and agencies that fall under its
umbrella, such as the Secret Service, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.55 Like the DOJ’s
policy, the DHS policy provides that search warrants must be obtained to use cell-site simulators and provides exceptions for “exigent circumstances” and “exceptional circumstances,” with the
explanation for each defined in the same manner as in the DOJ policy.56 The DHS policy also only applies to criminal investigations,
meaning when the “DHS is patrolling the ‘border,’ conducting
certain immigration activities, or monitoring conferences—no protections apply.”57 Lastly, the DHS policy, like the DOJ policy, does
not apply to state or local officials unless they are working with the
DHS.58 This leaves it up to each state to individually implement
policies or guidelines restricting the use of Stingrays by their law
enforcement agencies.
C. Stingray Use at the State and Local Level
Rigmaiden’s discovery that the federal government was using
technology capable of tracking him through his cell phone led to a
public desire for information on how Stingrays were being used and
53

See Tal Kopan, DOJ Cracks Down on Use of Cell-Duping Stingrays, CNN (Sept. 3,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/03/politics/stingrays-cell-site-simulator-justicedepartment-rules/ [https://perma.cc/J7WL-BYC6].
54
See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., POLICY DIRECTIVE 047-02, DEPARTMENT POLICY
REGARDING THE USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY (2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Department%20Policy%20Regardi
ng%20the%20Use%20of%20Cell-Site%20Simulator%20Technology.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VX9C-N699] [hereinafter DOH Policy].
55
See id. at 1.
56
See id. at 4–5.
57
Neema Singh Guliani, The Four Biggest Problems with DHS’s New Stingray Policy,
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 22, 2015, 6:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/freefuture/four-biggest-problems-dhss-new-stingray-policy [https://perma.cc/N787-ULA5].
“Border” is defined as one hundred air miles from any external boundary of the United
States, including coastal boundaries, unless an agency official sets a shorter distance. See 8
C.F.R. § 287.1(b) (2015).
58
See DOH Policy, supra note 54, at 8.
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a battle between state officials and the public over the release of
this information. Information regarding Stingrays has been hard to
come by because the FBI, Harris, and state agencies continually
fight any requests made for information. This starts with the FBI
and Harris requiring the signing of non-disclosure agreements in
order for local and state law enforcement agencies to obtain Stingrays.59
Through a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request, a
non-disclosure agreement between the Erie County Sheriff’s Office and the FBI seems to indicate that the FCC is the agency requiring such agreements.60 However, documents obtained through
other FOIA requests reveal a different truth. These documents
show Harris made a request to the FCC for licensing restrictions61
based on concerns from the FBI “over the proliferation of surreptitious law enforcement surveillance equipment.”62 The FCC
granted this request in 2012.63 This means that the FCC does not
require the signing of a non-disclosure agreement, as claimed by the
FBI,64 but instead requires local law enforcement only “coordinate
with the FBI before the purchase and use of Stingray devices.”65
As a result, it is either the FBI or Harris who is requiring the sign59

See Kim Zetter, Police Contract with Spy Tool Maker Prohibits Talking About Device’s
Use, WIRED (Mar. 4, 2014, 4:34 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/harris-stingraynda/ [https://perma.cc/Y83T-BB3V]; see also FBI Now Says Stingray Surveillance Can Be
Disclosed, RT (May 15, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/259105-fbi-stingraynondisclosure-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/JAJ2-EPFT].
60
See Letter Agreement Between Fed. Bureau of Investigation and Erie Cty Sheriff’s
Office 1 (June 29, 2012), http://www.nyclu.org/files/20120629-renondisclsureobligations(Harris-ECSO).pdf [https://perma.cc/5XEB-X3GX] [hereinafter Erie County
Nondisclosure Agreement] (“Consistent with the conditions on the equipment
authorization granted to Harris Corporation by the [FCC], state and local law
enforcement agencies must coordinate with the [FBI] to complete this non-disclosure
agreement prior to the acquisition and use of the equipment/technology authorized by the
FCC authorization.”).
61
The restrictions requested were that: “(1) the marketing and sale of these devices
shall be limited to federal/state/local public safety and law enforcement officials only;
and, (2) state and local law enforcement agencies must advance coordinate with the FBI
the acquisition and use of the equipment authorized under this authorization.” Cushing,
supra note 24.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See Erie County Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 60.
65
Cushing, supra note 24 (emphasis added).
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ing of a boilerplate non-disclosure agreement, as indicated by executed agreements discovered in the District of Columbia,66 Arizona,67 Florida,68 New York,69 Maryland,70 and elsewhere.71
Taking the Erie County Sheriff’s Office agreement as an example representative of the group, we see that the Sheriff’s Office is
barred from discussing any information about the surveillance tool
“to the public, including any non-law enforcement individuals or
agencies.”72 The Sheriff’s Office may only share information with
other law enforcement or government agencies with the prior written approval of the FBI.73 Additionally, the letter stated that the
Sheriff’s Office “shall not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, use
or provide any information concerning the Harris Corporation
wireless collection equipment/technology.”74 If the Sheriff’s Office discovers that a prosecutor or court intends to disclose such
information, the Sheriff’s Office must “immediately notify the FBI
in order to allow sufficient time for the FBI to intervene to protect
the equipment/technology and information from disclosure and
potential compromise.”75 The FBI could then require the Sheriff’s
Office to “seek dismissal of the case in lieu of providing, or allowing others to provide, any such information.”76 Lastly, the Sheriff’s
66

See Letter Agreement Between Fed. Bureau of Investigation and Metro DC Police
Dep’t (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/283244771?access_key=keyFKWtXK9zFChGaoOck6zD&allow_share=true&escape=false&view_mode=scroll
[https://perma.cc/Z34F-4W49].
67
See Zetter, supra note 59.
68
See FDLE-FBI Non-Disclosure Obligations/Guidelines, FLA. DEP’T L. ENFORCEMENT
(Mar. 8, 2012), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1814785/hillsboroughcounty-sheriff-fl.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV6E-TVBM].
69
Erie County Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 60.
70
See Letter Agreement Between Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Balt. Police Dep’t, and
Office of the State’s Att’y for Balt. City (July 13, 2011), https://www.document
cloud.org/documents/1808819-baltimore-police-stingray-non-disclosure-agreement.html
[https://perma.cc/AG6U-6J7Y].
71
See Sean Robinson, Group Sues Tacoma Police over Stingray Agreement, NEWS TRIB.
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/politics-government/article
37341000.html [https://perma.cc/RGP4-3VTT] (“[The] boilerplate agreement [has
been] disclosed by twelve law enforcement agencies in eight states.”).
72
Erie County Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 60, at 2.
73
See id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 3.
76
Id.
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Office is also required to notify the FBI if any FOIA requests, or
the like, are made concerning the technology so that the FBI can
attempt to prevent disclosure.77
Despite the plain language of the agreements, the FBI has
stated that its non-disclosure agreements with local law enforcement agencies are “not intended to shield the technology’s use.”78
Despite this claim, it is clear multiple efforts have been made to do
just that. The standard tactic of stonewalling was made when local
police in Florida neither denied nor confirmed the existence of relevant documents in response to a public records request about its
use of cell phone location tracking instruments, despite the fact the
city had already publicly acknowledged having a Stingray.79 Additionally, numerous cases have been dropped when the prosecution
is questioned on how law enforcement used the Stingray to obtain
evidence in that case rather than turn over such information.80
77

See id. at 4.
FBI Now Says Stingray Surveillance Can Be Disclosed, supra note 59 (“The [nondisclosure agreement] should not be construed to prevent a law enforcement officer from
disclosing to the court or a prosecutor the fact that this technology was used in a
particular case.”).
79
See Nathan Freed Wessler, Local Police in Florida Acting Like They’re the CIA (But
They’re Not), AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 25, 2014, 10:00 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/local-police-florida-acting-theyre-cia-theyre-not
[https://perma.cc/CT4P-RFSZ].
80
See, e.g., Justin Fenton, Baltimore Police Used Secret Technology to Track Cellphones in
Thousands of Cases, BALT. SUN (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-stingray-case-20150408-story.html
[https://perma.cc/U389-2S9V] (reporting that prosecutors in Baltimore withdrew
evidence obtained through the use of a Stingray before a judge could hold a detective in
contempt of court for not answering questions); Greenemeier, supra note 6 (finding that
the Baltimore Police Department signed a nondisclosure agreement with the FBI that
instructed prosecutors to drop cases rather than reveal the department’s use of the
stingray); Ellen Nakashima, Secrecy Around Police Surveillance Equipment Proves a Case’s
Undoing, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/secrecy-around-police-surveillance-equipment-proves-a-casesundoing/2015/02/22/ce72308a-b7ac-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html
[https://perma.cc/3ZRL-RTEC] (reporting that after a state judge ordered the police to
show the Stingray device to the defense attorneys, the state offered one of the defendants
six months probation when a usual sentence for the charge receives at least four years in
jail); St. Louis Prosecutors Drop Charges Before Spy Tool Used in Arrests Is Revealed in Court,
RT (Apr. 20, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/251345-missouri-stingraycharges-dropped/ [https://perma.cc/8X4N-PJFL] (“Prosecutors in St. Louis, Missouri
have dropped more than a dozen charges against three defendants accused of
78
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Perhaps the most startling attempt to withhold information occurred in Florida. After a public records request pertaining to cell
phone surveillance was made, the local police department responded they had such records.81 These records showed how a local detective had obtained authorization for Stingray use under the state
“trap and trace” statute.82 However, before the documents could
be inspected, the U.S. Marshals Service deputized the local detective, claimed the records therefore became the property of the federal government, and instructed the local police not to release the
records.83
Such tactics indicate states, either of their own accord or under
the direction of the FBI and Harris, are still trying to hide their use
of Stingrays. Washington,84 Utah,85 Virginia,86 California,87 and

participating in a string of robberies in late 2013 on the eve of a court hearing on the police
department’s use of a controversial spy tool.”).
81
See Nathan Freed Wessler, U.S. Marshals Seize Local Cops’ Cell Phone Tracking Files
in Extraordinary Attempt to Keep Information From Public, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (June
3, 2014, 12:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/us-marshals-seize-local-cops-cell-phonetracking-files-extraordinary-attempt-keep-information [https://perma.cc/9E5V-XVAZ].
82
See id.
83
See id.
84
H.B. 1440, 64th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2015) (“The state and its political
subdivisions shall not, by means of a cell-site simulator device, collect or use a person’s
electronic data or metadata without (1) that person’s informed consent, (2) a warrant,
based upon probable cause, that describes with particularity the person, place, or thing to
be searched or seized, or (3) acting in accordance with a legally recognized exception to
the warrant requirements.”).
85
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102(1)(a) (West 2014) (“[A] government entity may not
obtain the location information, stored data, or transmitted data of an electronic device
without a search warrant issued by a court upon probable cause.”).
86
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3(K) (2015) (“An investigative or law-enforcement officer
shall not use any device to obtain electronic communications or collect real-time location
data from an electronic device without first obtaining a search warrant authorizing the use
of the device if, in order to obtain the contents of such electronic communications or such
real-time location data from the provider of electronic communication service or remote
computing service, such officer would be required to obtain a search warrant pursuant to
this section.”).
87
The California law, approved in October 2015, “require[s] police agencies to get city
council approval before employing” the use of a cell-site simulator. See Williams, supra
note 11; see also S.B. 741, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015), https://leginfo
.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB741
[https://perma.cc/XT5J-B92D].
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Minnesota88 all have statutes with guidelines on Stingray use and
require warrants prior to their use. However, these states are the
minority. At least sixty-one agencies in twenty-three states and the
District of Columbia use Stingrays, and most of these states have
no such guidelines.89 State law enforcement typically obtains Stingrays with federal money on the basis of anti-terror grants, but then
actually use the Stingrays for purposes other than combating terrorism.90
For example, the Michigan Police Department paid more than
$200,000 for cellular tracking equipment, including a Stingray,
with a DHS grant.91 The department justified the purchase on the
basis of “allow[ing] the state to track the physical location of a suspected terrorist who is using wireless communications as part of
their operation.”92 This justification proved to be completely false,
as evidence shows that the department never used it to track a terrorist.93 Instead, out of 128 investigations where the department
used Stingrays in 2014, most were for homicides, burglaries and
robberies, assaults, and missing persons, as well as for minor offenses such as drug crimes, obstructing police, and fraud.94 The
Baltimore Police Department is another example of a local agency
without any guidelines that used a Stingray to track a range of criminals from killers to petty thieves.95
Without legislative guidelines, Maryland, Michigan, and other
states typically employ the use of Stingrays without any judicial
88

MINN. STAT. § 626A.42(2) (2014) (“[A] government entity may not obtain the
location information of an electronic device without a tracking warrant. A warrant
granting access to location information must be issued only if the government entity
shows that there is probable cause the person who possesses an electronic device is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.”).
89
See Who’s Got Them, supra note 3; supra note 16 and accompanying text.
90
See Kelly, supra note 17.
91
See Nathan Freed Wessler, Police Citing “Terrorism” to Buy Stingrays Used Only for
Ordinary Crimes, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/police-citing-terrorism-buy-stingrays-used-onlyordinary-crimes [https://perma.cc/665Z-TJSY].
92
See id.
93
See id.
94
Id.
95
See Surveillance Log, BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S ADVANCED TECHNICAL
TEAM,
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2287407/cell-site-data-request060815-bds-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW2Q-GUU2] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
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application.96 Some local agencies even use the devices through
deceptive means.97 For example, some will draft surveillance requests to use Stingrays and make them appear as pen register applications instead.98 A template for a pen register request used by
the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department to deploy a Stingray was
obtained through a FOIA request.99 Nowhere in the application do
the words Stingray, IMSI catcher, or anything of the like appear.100
One ACLU attorney believes this application template is very unusual and “likely to mislead judges who receive applications based
on it because it gives no indication that the Sheriff’s Department
intends to use a Stingray.”101 Notably, pen registers are far different than Stingrays.
D. How Stingrays are Different from Pen Registers and Why This
Matters
A pen register records the numbers dialed in incoming and outgoing calls to and from a targeted number,102 while a Stingray col96

See Zetter, supra note 47.
See Clarence Walker, New Hi-Tech Police Surveillance: The “Stingray” Cell Phone
Spying Device, GLOBAL RES. (May 19, 2015), http://www.globalresearch.ca/new-hi-techpolice-surveillance-the-stingray-cell-phone-spying-device/5331165
[https://perma.cc/NLG8-WY9P].
98
See id.
99
See Tim Cushing, ‘Insert Probable Cause’: Pen Register Boilerplate Hides Sheriff’s
Department’s Hundreds Of Stingray Deployments, TECHDIRT (June 3, 2015, 4:15 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150525/17150031098/insert-probable-cause-penregister-boilerplate-hides-sheriffs-departments-hundreds-stingray-deployments.shtml
[https://perma.cc/4TRP-2E5B]. The agency has used a Stingray at least 303 times. Id.
100
See id.
101
Cyrus Farivar, County Sheriff Has Used Stingray over 300 Times with No Warrant,
ARS TECHNICA (May 24, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/
05/county-sheriff-has-used-stingray-over-300-times-with-no-warrant/
[https://perma.cc/ZQK8-G36A].
102
See Matt Blaze, How Law Enforcement Tracks Cellular Phones, EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH
BLOG (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.crypto.com/blog/celltapping/ [https://perma.cc/
8MH3-56DJ]. The statutory definition of a pen register is:
[T]he term “pen register” means a device or process which records
or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information
transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or
electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that
such information shall not include the contents of any
communication, but such term does not include any device or process
used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication
97

2016]

REAL-TIME TRACKING OF CELL PHONES

1013

lects information from every cell phone in its vicinity, leaving the
disposal of the information collected from the non-targeted phones
to the discretion of the user.103 In other words, a pen register simply allows for the electronic delivery of call information from a telephone company to law enforcement for only the numbers specified
in law enforcement’s requests,104 while a Stingray can track the
precise location of every cell phone near it and provide the identifying information of each of those phones.105 This means that Stingrays “subject [a] potentially unlimited number[] of innocent
people to dragnet surveillance” with absolutely no indication that
such a search occurred or that the search may have intruded into
their private residence or other “constitutionally protected spaces.”106
The Supreme Court has held use of a pen register is not a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.107 Furthermore, individuals have no expectation of privacy in the telephone number they
dial.108 Accordingly, “[t]he judicial role in approving [the] use of
trap and trace devices is ministerial in nature.”109 A federal court
merely needs to find that “the attorney for the government has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such
installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”110 As explained previously though, Stingrays are being used
to do much more than merely record the numbers dialed and received on cell phones; they are used to track people.111 This leads
service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for
communications services provided by such provider or any device or
process used by a provider or customer of a wire communication
service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary
course of its business.
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012).
103
Cushing, supra note 99.
104
See Blaze, supra note 102.
105
See Stingrays, supra note 14.
106
Justin Fenton, ACLU Joins Md. Federal Case over Cellphone Tracking, BALT. SUN
(Nov. 26, 2014, 6:55 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimorecity/bs-md-ci-aclu-stingray-brief-20141125-story.html [https://perma.cc/LX6E-XV6L].
107
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979).
108
Id. at 743.
109
United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995).
110
18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2012).
111
See text accompanying supra notes 3–8.
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to the question of whether or not use of a Stingray constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment and should therefore be subject to the more stringent requirements of a warrant prior to its use.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
This Part discusses the origin and development of the Fourth
Amendment. Section II.A provides a brief history of the Fourth
Amendment. Section II.B discusses the Fourth Amendment’s implications on the use of historical location data before being compared to real-time tracking in Section II.C. Then Section II.D. discusses the mosaic theory and its potential impact on the Fourth
Amendment. Lastly, Section II.E looks into the advance of technology and the Supreme Court’s response.
A. The History Behind the Fourth Amendment
The Framer’s disdain for the “general warrants” and “writs of
assistance” from the colonial era, which allowed British officers to
go through all the contents of a person’s home looking for evidence, resulted in the drafting of the Fourth Amendment.112 Their
contempt for these searches was a “driving force[] behind the Revolution itself.”113 The Framers consequently did not want to confer
any discretionary authority to officers that would allow them to
conduct such general searches.114 This is why the Fourth Amendment was specifically aimed at barring Congress from having the
ability to allow the issuance of general warrants; it was not, howev112

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014); see Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 311 (1978) (“The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the
Colonies immediately preceding the Revolution.”); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 7–8 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (“It cannot be
doubted that the Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the
colonists’ experience with the writs of assistance and their memories of the general
warrants formerly in use in England.”); see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (noting how a
young John Adams listened to James Otis’s speech against general warrants and later said
that it was “the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great
Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.”).
113
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
114
See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 197, 201, 212 (1993); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 578 (1999).

2016]

REAL-TIME TRACKING OF CELL PHONES

1015

er, aimed at creating the broad reasonableness standard that is in
place today.115
The Framers assumed that the common-law background protecting warrantless intrusions and explaining when warrants were
required would remain in place, thereby making it unnecessary to
implement text into the Fourth Amendment regarding such procedures.116 This is why the Framers were content in stating only the
standards necessary for a valid warrant as common law already
placed restraints on the discretionary authority of officers conducting searches and seizures.117 However, this foundation became
blurred when legislative codes began undermining the notion of a
“permanent common law.”118 This shift in policy, coupled with
concerns about crime and social disorder during the nineteenth
century, expanded the authority of the warrantless officer.119
The foundation of the modern Fourth Amendment is rooted in
Weeks v. United States.120 Weeks extended the Fourth Amendment
to the actions of a warrantless officer acting “under color of his office.”121 This had the effect of constitutionalizing the requirement
of a warrant to search a house,122 and introduced the exclusionary
rule to illegally obtained evidence.123 The next step was the inser115

Davies, supra note 114, at 557–60, 724.
See id. at 724.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 725.
119
See id. (“New concerns about crime and social disorder during the nineteenth
century gave rise to a perception that the common-law structure of law enforcement was
inadequate to meet the needs of an increasingly complex and urban society.
Contemporaneously with the advent of police departments and career officers, courts and
legislatures drastically expanded the ex officio authority of the warrantless officer.”).
120
See id. at 729.
121
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393–94, (1914) (“[T]he [Fourth]
Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and property against unlawful
invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law, acting under legislative or
judicial sanction. This protection is equally extended to the action of the government and
officers of the law acting under it. To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by
judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized
action.” (internal citations omitted)).
122
See id. at 398 (finding that the taking of letters from the defendant’s house is “in
direct violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant”).
123
By characterizing the act of the officer as “in direct violation of the constitutional
rights of the defendant,” the Court placed a warrantless search in the same category as
116
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tion of a “reasonableness” standard into a warrantless search.124
Carroll v. United States accomplished this when the Court upheld
the warrantless search of an automobile on the basis that the
Fourth Amendment only prohibits searches that are “unreasonable,” and it was “‘not unreasonable’ for the police to conduct a
warrantless search of a car for contraband in the circumstances.”125
This concept of “reasonableness” would become the central principle of the Fourth Amendment in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.126
The reasonableness standard used today was articulated in
Katz v. United States.127 In this case, the defendant violated a federal statute by using a telephone to transmit wagering information,
and at trial, the prosecution used evidence obtained through an
electronic listening and recording device attached to the outside of
a public telephone booth that the defendant had used.128 The Court
recognized that “the Fourth Amendment protects people—and
not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and seizures.”129 This interpretation makes it clear that whether or not a
“search” has occurred under the Fourth Amendment “cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any
given enclosure.”130 Therefore, the previous requirement of a
physical trespass for a “search” to occur was bad law in modern
times as “reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by
electronic as well as physical invasion.”131
the “void” court order in Boyd v. United States. See id.; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886). The Court in Boyd, in excluding an invoice produced under unconstitutional
statutory authority, relied upon a conclusion in Marbury v. Madison that the Court has no
authority to recognize a “void” government act. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638; Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803). Under this string of logic, exclusion is a necessary
consequence of a government search that violates constitutional authority. See Davies,
supra note 114, at 730.
124
See Davies, supra note 114, at 731.
125
Id.; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925) (“The Fourth
Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are
unreasonable.”).
126
See Davies, supra note 114, at 732.
127
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
128
See id. at 348.
129
Id. at 353.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).

2016]

REAL-TIME TRACKING OF CELL PHONES

1017

As a result, Justice Harlan came up with a two-prong test to determine whether or not a Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurred. First, a court determines whether a person has “exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”132 Using this test, it was determined that someone who goes
into a telephone booth, shuts the door, and pays to make a phone
call “is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being
intercepted.”133 The booth “is a temporarily private place whose
momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are
recognized as reasonable.”134 Justice Harlan’s concurrence from
Katz has become known as the “Katz test” and is the touchstone
analysis of any Fourth Amendment question.135 This analysis was
recently applied to the use of cell phones in United States v. Davis.136
B. The Acquisition and Use of Historical Cell Tower Records
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Davis involved a review of
whether or not a statutorily-prescribed judicial order to a third party cellular telephone service provider to turn over “historical cell
tower location information” to the federal government on one of
its users constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.137
This data was beneficial because MetroPCS, Davis’ cell phone
provider, used it to identify the locations of their cell towers, allowing the police to compare the locations of the robberies to those of
132

Id. at 361. Even though this is a concurring opinion, the Supreme Court has
subsequently applied Justice Harlan’s principle to hold that a Fourth Amendment search
occurs when “‘the individual manifest[s] a subjective expectation of privacy in the object
of the challenged search’ and ‘society is willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable.’” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
133
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
134
Id.
135
See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating the
Katz test has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s concurrence); Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (expressly adopting Justice Harlan’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy” formula as the rule of Katz).
136
785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015).
137
Id. at 503. “Historical cell tower location information” is historical telephone
records for a number requested, which shows, among other things, “the number assigned
to the cell tower that wirelessly connected the calls from and to Davis” and “the sector
number associated with that tower.” Id. at 502–03.
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the cell towers connecting Davis’ calls around the time of the robberies.138 This showed the cell tower sites were near the robbery
locations.139 Therefore, the prosecution was able to argue that Davis must have also been near the robberies.140
The main doctrine relied upon in Davis for admitting the historical location data was the third party doctrine.141 This doctrine
holds that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”142 Using this
line of reasoning, the Davis court held that since cell phone users
know their phone must connect to a cell tower, that the signal is
only transmitted when they make or receive a call, and that this
signal is also sent to their service provider, the cell user is aware
that he is “conveying cell tower location information to the service
provider and voluntarily does so.”143 Consequently, there is no expectation of privacy in telephone records that show past cell tower
locations.144 This line of reasoning is different when courts look at
real-time location tracking.
C. Real-Time Tracking Through the Use of Physical Tracking Devices
The Supreme Court first confronted the use of a tracking device in United States v. Knotts, where law enforcement agents
placed a beeper,145 without a warrant, in a drum of chloroform purchased by one of the defendants.146 The agents subsequently monitored the progress of a car carrying the chloroform and traced the
drum from its place of purchase in Minnesota to the defendant’s
cabin in Wisconsin.147 It is important to note that the “surveillance
amounted principally to the following of a car on public streets and
138

See id. at 501.
See id.
140
Id. at 502.
141
See generally id.
142
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
143
Davis, 785 F.3d at 510.
144
See id.
145
A beeper is “[a] radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic
signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.” United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,
277 (1983).
146
See id. The beeper was placed in the drum with the consent of Hawkins Chemical
Company who subsequently sold it to the defendants. See id. at 278.
147
See id. at 277.
139
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highways” because a person travelling in an automobile on public
roads has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another.148 While travelling on public streets, a
person “voluntarily convey[s] to anyone who want[s] to
look . . . that he is travelling over particular roads in a particular direction,” the locations of any stops he makes, and “his final destination when he exit[s] from public roads onto private property.”149
While the owner of the cabin had an expectation of privacy within
the cabin, that notion did not carry over into law enforcement’s
observation of the car arriving to the cabin, nor did it extend to the
transportation of the drum in the “open fields” outside the cabin.150 Law enforcement’s use of the beeper to supplement their
visual surveillance makes no difference as “[n]othing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them in this case.”151 Furthermore, even though the police would not have been able to locate
the final resting place of the chloroform without the beeper in this
case,152 had an agent wanted to, he could have followed the defendant in a car without the use of a beeper and determined the final
resting place of the chloroform.153 Therefore, the Court reasoned,
the scientific enhancement used here raised “no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also raise,” so no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred.154
United States v. Karo addresses two issues left unresolved by
Knotts: (1) whether tracking a container through the placement of a
beeper in a container with the consent of the original owner, but
not with the buyer’s consent, is a search under the Fourth
Amendment; and (2) whether acquiring information that could not
have been obtained through normal, visual surveillance makes the
148

Id. at 281.
Id. at 281–82.
150
Id. at 282.
151
Id. But see infra Section II.E (noting how sense-enhancing technology can be
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment).
152
See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. When the defendant “began making evasive
maneuvers . . . the pursuing agents ended their visual surveillance.” Id.
153
See id. at 282.
154
See id. at 285.
149
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monitoring of the beeper a Fourth Amendment violation.155 The
facts in Karo are very similar to those in Knotts.156
In answering the first question, the Court held that “[t]he mere
transfer to [the defendant] of a can containing an unmonitored
beeper infringed no privacy interest” because “it conveyed no information at all. . . . [I]t created a potential for an invasion of privacy,” but a potential, as opposed to an actual, invasion of privacy
does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.157 It is
only when these “technological advances” are actually exploited
that Fourth Amendment privacy interests come into play.158
This brings us to the second question. Employing the same
analysis used in Knotts,159 the Court first recognized the basic
Fourth Amendment principle that “private residences are places in
which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental
intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”160
Therefore, had the agents gone into one of the residences to check
if the ether was there without a warrant because they had no beeper
to monitor, it surely would have been an illegal search under the
Fourth Amendment.161 Consequently, when law enforcement employs an electronic device to obtain information from inside a
house that it could not have obtained by observation from outside
the area surrounding the house, it too must be an illegal search.162
This occurred in Karo because even though visual surveillance
155

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984).
After a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agent learned that the
defendants had ordered fifty gallons of ether to extract cocaine from clothing they had
imported, the government obtained a court order to install and monitor a beeper in one of
the cans of ether, with the informant’s consent. Id. at 708. Thereafter, agents saw one of
the defendants pick up the ether from the informant, followed him to his house, and
determined by using the beeper that the ether was inside the house where it was then
monitored. Id. at 708–09. After being moved to various locations, the agents determined
that the can with the beeper in it was inside a house rented by the defendants and
obtained a warrant to search the house based in part on information derived through use
of the beeper. Id. at 709–10.
157
Id. at 712.
158
Id.
159
See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
160
Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
161
See id. at 715.
162
See id.
156
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alone may have been enough to witness the ether entering the residence, the beeper confirmed what law enforcement saw and the
continual monitoring of the beeper provided verification that the
beeper had not left the residence.163 Thus, the case is not like
Knotts, where the beeper only provided information that could
have also been obtained through visual surveillance.164 In Karo, the
monitoring indicated a fact that could not have been obtained
through visual surveillance—that the beeper was inside the
house.165
Based upon this reasoning, the Court held that the Government
cannot:
[B]e completely free from the constraints of the
Fourth Amendment to determine by means of an
electronic device, without a warrant and without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a
particular article—or a person, for that matter—is
in an individual’s home at a particular time. Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been
withdrawn from public view would present far too
serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to
escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment
oversight.166
It does not matter that a warrant requirement in this situation
would require the government to get warrants in a large number of
cases167 nor does it matter that it will be difficult to meet the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity requirement in such instances.168 The
search of a house must be conducted with a warrant.169
163

Id.
See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text.
165
See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
166
Id. at 716.
167
See id. at 718. The prosecution argued that “[i]f agents are required to obtain
warrants prior to monitoring a beeper when it has been withdrawn from public
view . . . for all practical purposes they will be forced to obtain warrants in every case in
which they seek to use a beeper, because they have no way of knowing in advance whether
the beeper will be transmitting its signals from inside private premises.” Id. The Court
found this argument to be hardly compelling. See id.
168
See id. The prosecution also argued that “it would be impossible to describe the
‘place’ to be searched, because the location of the place is precisely what is sought to be
164
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The final and most recent case on the use of a tracking device is
United States v. Jones.170 Again, the facts are very similar to Knotts
and Karo.171 The Court found that “the attachment of a [GPS]
tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets,
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”172 The different outcome is a result of the analysis employed by the majority of the Court. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, focused on the trespass involved with the placing of the
beeper and declared that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test.”173 Therefore, because “the government physicaldiscovered through the search. However true that may be, it will still be possible to
describe the object into which the beeper is to be placed, the circumstances that led
agents to wish to install the beeper, and the length of time for which beeper surveillance is
requested. In our view, this information will suffice to permit issuance of a warrant
authorizing beeper installation and surveillance.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also
infra Section III.D (discussing the issues presented by the particularity requirement).
169
See id.
170
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
171
Jones . . . was made the target of an investigation . . . . Officers
employed various investigative techniques, including visual
surveillance of the nightclub, installation of a camera focused on the
front door of the club, and a pen register and wiretap covering Jones’s
cellular phone.
Based in part on information gathered from these sources, in
2005 the Government applied . . . for a warrant authorizing the use of
an electronic tracking device on the [vehicle] registered to Jones’s
wife. A warrant issued, authorizing installation of the device in the
District of Columbia and within [ten] days.
On the [eleventh] day, and not in the District of Columbia but in
Maryland, agents installed a GPS tracking device on the
undercarriage of the Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot.
Over the next [twenty-eight] days, the Government used the device
to track the vehicle’s movements, and once had to replace the
device’s battery when the vehicle was parked in a different public lot
in Maryland. By means of signals from multiple satellites, the device
established the vehicle’s location within [fifty] to [one hundred] feet,
and communicated that location by cellular phone to a Government
computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages of data over the [four]–
week period.
Id. at 948.
172
Id. at 948, 954.
173
Id. at 952.
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ly occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information,” the Court had no doubt that such an intrusion was a
“search” within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.174 The Katz test remains applicable to “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass.”175
Knotts is distinguishable from Jones because Knotts only conducted a Katz analysis, there was no challenge to the physical installation of the beeper, and the Court declined to consider the installation’s effect on its Fourth Amendment analysis.176 However,
the conclusion in Karo—that installation with the consent of the
original owner, then delivered to a buyer having no knowledge of
the beeper, does not constitute a search—was determined to be
consistent with the Court’s holding in Jones.177
It is important to note that Justice Scalia and the three justices
who joined the majority opinion did not find it necessary to determine whether or not using strictly electronic surveillance over a
four-week period, which may have been possible through traditional, visual observation, without an accompanying trespass is an unconstitutional search.178 While Justice Sotomayor agreed that the
trespassory analysis should be employed first and that its analysis
alone was sufficient to decide this case,179 she also recognized and
agreed with Justice Alito’s concurrence, joined by three other justices, finding that “physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many
174

Id. at 949.
Id. at 953.
176
See id. at 952. The Court found that Knotts might have been applicable “if the
government were making the argument that what would otherwise be an unconstitutional
search is not such where it produces only public information. The government does not
make that argument, and we know of no case that would support it.” Id.
177
See id. (“Karo accepted the container as it came to him, beeper and all, and was
therefore not entitled to object to the beeper’s presence, even though it was used to
monitor the container’s location.”).
178
See id. at 953–54.
179
See id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The government usurped Jones’
property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, thereby invading privacy
interests long afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment protection . . . .
[T]he trespassory test applied in the majority’s opinion reflects an irreducible
constitutional minimum: when the government physically invades personal property to
gather information, a search occurs. The reaffirmation of that principle suffices to decide
this case.”).
175
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forms of surveillance” and “at the very least, ‘longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’”180
Justice Alito’s approach made a Katz analysis similar to those
done in Knotts181 and Karo.182 Justice Alito reasoned that in most
cases, long term GPS monitoring infringes upon reasonable expectations of privacy, as society has long held the belief that law enforcement would not have the resources to discreetly monitor a
person’s every movement.183 The exact point at which the monitoring became a search in this case is not necessary to determine as
that “line was surely crossed before the four-week mark,” although
“[o]ther cases may present more difficult questions.”184 In those
situations where it is not clear whether or not GPS surveillance will
amount to a Fourth Amendment search, the police can always play
it safe by getting a warrant first.185
This shows that a majority of the Supreme Court (through the
majority and concurrence opinions) deemed the duration of the
GPS monitoring as a critical factor in their analysis due to the fact
that no reasonable person would expect law enforcement to use the
resources necessary to conduct such a long surveillance through
traditional means.186 GPS surveillance intrudes on expectations of
privacy because the information in its totality reveals intimate details of a person’s life.187 This line of reasoning is an articulation of
the mosaic theory.

180

Id. at 955 (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)).
See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
182
See supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text.
183
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
184
See id.
185
See id.
186
See id. at 956. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“And because GPS monitoring is cheap
in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement
practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”); supra notes 183–85 and
accompanying text.
187
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
181
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D. The Mosaic Theory
The mosaic theory188 holds that “the aggregation of vast
amounts of metadata should be considered a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it can reveal a great
deal about a person’s life, even if each piece of data may reveal little when viewed in isolation.”189 It provides an opportunity for the
courts to protect against the privacy intrusions presented by the
ever-evolving technological landscape in the era of big data.190 Under this theory, a court would determine Fourth Amendment interests on a case-by-case basis, “assessing the quality and quantity
of information about a suspect gathered in the course of a specific
investigation.”191
Justice Sotomayor in Jones, while not explicitly using the term
“mosaic theory,” suggested that the Court may need to adopt such
an approach in the near future.192 She forewarned that the Court
would eventually need to recognize the growing concern of how
easily technology enables law enforcement to acquire personal in188

While the Supreme Court justices never explicitly used the term “mosaic theory” in
Jones, the Court of Appeals used this term. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544,
562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“As with the ‘mosaic theory’ often invoked by the government in
cases involving national security information, ‘What may seem trivial to the uninformed,
may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene.’ Prolonged
surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as
what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These
types of information can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip
viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not
told by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places over the course of a
month. The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still more; a single trip to a
gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later by
a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A person who knows all of another’s
travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the
gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of
particular individuals or political groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but
all such facts.” (internal citations omitted)).
189
Jonathan Hafetz, Bulk Data Collection and the Mosaic Theory: A More Balanced
Approach to Information, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 17, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.just
security.org/5758/guest-post-bulk-data-collection-mosaic-theory/
[https://perma.cc/RAG2-JYWC].
190
Id.
191
David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV.
62, 101 (2013).
192
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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formation and how such unrestrained power is susceptible to abuse
by the government.193 She specifically mentioned that physical intrusion is no longer necessary to conduct GPS tracking because
GPS-enabled smartphones permit law enforcement to conduct
non-trespassory surveillance.194 Law enforcement’s ability to ascertain information about a person, including his political affiliation,
religion, and sexual habits, through the sum of his public movements should be taken into account in determining a person’s expectation of privacy.195
Justice Alito used a similar line of reasoning in Jones, stating
that “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents
and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could
not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual’s car for a very long period.”196 He was specifically concerned about the ease in which the tracking occurred and how it
was continuous and precise.197 Essentially, Justice Alito suggested
the adoption of the mosaic theory through his concern with how
much information the continuous tracking revealed—indicating
five Justices on the Supreme Court may be ready to adopt the mosaic theory.198
Two years later, in Riley v. California, the Court held that police generally cannot search an arrestee’s cell phone at the time of
an arrest without obtaining a warrant.199 Explaining why the arrestee’s wallet could be searched but his cell phone could not be, the
Court offered an argument resembling the mosaic theory:
[A] cell phone collects in one place many distinct
types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal
much more in combination than any isolated
193

See id. at 956.
See id. at 955.
195
See id. at 955–56.
196
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
197
See id. at 963–64.
198
Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence in Jones, along with Justice Alito’s
concurrence in the same case, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice
Kagan, indicate a willingness by the Court to adopt the mosaic theory. See text
accompanying supra notes 192, 196–97.
199
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
194

2016]

REAL-TIME TRACKING OF CELL PHONES

1027

record. . . . The sum of an individual’s private life
can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or
two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. [Finally], the
data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the
phone, or even earlier. A person might carry in his
pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr.
Jones; he would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several
months, as would routinely be kept on a phone.200
The Court also echoed Justice Sotomayor’s concern about cell
phone location data in that it can be used to reconstruct someone’s
movements down to the minute and within a specific building, reflecting intimate details of that person’s life.201 Riley provides us
with hints that nearly all of the Justices may be open to mosaic
theory reasoning in regards to the Fourth Amendment.202 This can
be seen as an important recognition by the Court as a way to protect the public from advances in technology. Another is laid out in
Kyllo v. United States.203
E. The Advance of Technology and the Court’s Response
Advances in technology, such as the Stingray, have made intrusions into the home easier and affected the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment.204 Prior to the advent
of smartphones, iPads, and every other technological innovation
that has shaped the world we live in today, the greatest safeguards
to our privacy were not found in the Constitution but were practic-

200

Id. at 2489. But see id. at 2489 n.1 (“Because the United States and California agree
that these cases involve searches incident to arrest, these cases do not implicate the
question whether the collection or inspection of aggregated digital information amounts
to a search under other circumstances.”).
201
See id. at 2490 (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
202
Every Justice but Justice Alito, who filed a concurring opinion, joined Chief Justice
Robert’s opinion. See id. at 2480 (majority opinion).
203
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
204
See id. at 33–34.
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al.205 Maintaining surveillance through conventional means over a
long period of time was costly and laborious and therefore rarely
done.206 Technological advances have made what used to take “a
large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance . . . relatively easy and cheap.”207 Society’s reasonable expectations of privacy will be continually transformed and shaped according to the accessibility and use of these advances.208 A new
surveillance technique, such as Stingrays, must be “judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”209
Kyllo v. United States put these expectations to the test. In this
case, agents used a thermal-imaging device to scan the defendant’s
home to ascertain whether or not the heat measurements coming
from the home were consistent with levels given from the sort of
lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth.210 Based in part
on the results of the scan showing that parts of the home were
warmer than others, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant to
search the defendant’s home where agents found marijuana growing.211 The Court ultimately held that:
[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that
could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area constitutes a search—at least where (as here)
the technology in question is not in general public
use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.212
In order to get to this conclusion, the Court first rejected recognizing a difference between “off-the-wall” observations and
205

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (“[T]he eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.”).
206
See id.
207
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963–64.
208
Id. at 963.
209
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
210
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
211
See id. at 30.
212
Id. at 34 (internal citations omitted).
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“through-the-wall surveillance.”213 The fact that thermal imaging
only detects heat radiating from the exterior of the house is immaterial because recognizing such a difference would “leave the
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the
home.”214 The “proposition that inference insulates a search”
must be rejected as well because it is contrary to Karo, “where the
police ‘inferred’ from the activation of a beeper that a certain can
of ether was in the home.”215
The next argument made by the government was that the
thermal imaging was constitutional because it did not detect private
activities occurring in private areas.216 Supreme Court cases show
that all details are intimate details when inside the home though,217
so the detail of how warm—or even how relatively warm—Kyllo
was heating his residence is also an intimate detail because it is in
his home.218 Therefore, because all details are intimate details
when inside the home and the Government used a device, not in
general public use, to procure information inside the home that
could not have been knowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively unreasonable without
a warrant.219
The dissent points out two fair criticisms. First, the majority
does not discuss how much use constitutes general public use.220
The dissent was the first of many to criticize this portion of the
opinion.221 Unfortunately, this portion of the standard has not be-

213

See id. at 35.
Id. at 35–36.
215
Id. at 36.
216
See id. at 38.
217
For example, a can of ether and the registration number of a phonograph turntable
have been found to be intimate details when inside a home. See generally Arizona v. Hicks,
480 U.S. 321 (1987); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
218
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
219
Id. at 40.
220
See id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221
See, e.g., Mary Kim, Investigation and Police Practices, 90 GEO. L.J. 1099 (2002);
Daniel McKenzie, What Were They Smoking?: The Supreme Court’s Latest Step In A Long,
Strange Trip Through The Fourth Amendment, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 153 (2002);
Reginald Short, Comment, The Kyllo Conundrum: A New Standard to Address Technology
214
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come any clearer. Since the standards were first articulated, no
thermal imaging device has been declared “in general public use”
and therefore free to be used without a warrant.222 Federal courts
have avoided even attempting to interpret this portion of the standard and instead have simply decided cases without commenting
specifically on the “general public use” portion of the standard.223
The second main criticism by the dissent was that “the category of ‘sense-enhancing technology’ covered by the new rule is far
too broad.”224 Justice Stevens argued that this rule would prohibit
mechanical substitutes for dog sniffs despite the fact that the Court
had already held that “a dog sniff that ‘discloses only the presence
or absence of narcotics’ does ‘not constitute a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.’”225 This fear proved to be
unfounded when, in Illinois v. Caballes, the Court reasoned that it
was critical to the Kyllo decision that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity, whereas a dog sniff can only detect unlawful
activity.226 There is an accepted, reasonable expectation that private, lawful activity will remain private, but that assumption is inapposite to the expectation that contraband in the trunk of your car
will also remain private.227 Therefore, the Court concluded that
“[a] dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop that reveals no
information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”228

That Represents A Step Backward For Fourth Amendment Protections, 80 DENV. U. L. REV.
463, 482–83 (2002).
222
Derek T. Conom, Sense-Enhancing Technology and the Search in the Wake of Kyllo v.
United States: Will Prevalence Kill Privacy?, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 749, 765 (2005).
223
See Conom, supra note 222, at 765; see also Baldi v. Amadon, No. CIV. 02-313-M,
2004 WL 725618, at *4 (D.N.H. Apr. 5, 2004) (distinguishing Kyllo and the general
public use standard by instead holding that since the scan with the night vision was done
outside Baldi’s curtilage and in the open fields of the area, MacKenzie did not see
anything “regarding the interior of the home that could not have been otherwise obtained
without physical intrusion”).
224
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225
Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
226
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2005).
227
Id. at 410.
228
Id.
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III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S IMPLICATIONS ON THE
USE OF A STINGRAY BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
This Part discusses the Fourth Amendment implications of the
use of a Stingray, and concludes that the Fourth Amendment requires, at minimum, law enforcement to obtain a warrant prior to
using a Stingray. Section III.A discusses modern Fourth Amendment cases dealing with different surveillance techniques and the
protection of the home versus public places. Section III.B explains
how the use of a Stingray is a Fourth Amendment search under a
traditional Katz analysis. Then, Section III.C distinguishes how the
real-time tracking of cell phone location data is different from historical cell phone location data. Lastly, Section III.D discusses the
possibility that use of Stingrays should be banned altogether because approval to use one may equate to a general warrant.
A. Warrantless Searches and the Courts’ Responses
While it is clear that the Framers of the Constitution could not
have predicted modern law enforcement needs,229 the discretionary
authority of officers today is far greater than what the Framers
could have ever imagined or wanted.230 This Section first discusses
how courts have reacted to the different surveillance methods and
techniques used by modern law enforcement and the applicability
of these decisions to a Stingray; particularly sense-enhancing technology and real-time tracking of automobiles. It then closes with
the modern view of the Supreme Court on the “mosaic theory”
and its applicability to Stingray use.
1. The Court’s Protection of the Home from SenseEnhancing Technology
People have always been able to be “free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion” under the protection of their own
home.231 One’s home is a place where an “individual normally ex229

See Nathan H. Seltzer, When History Matters Not: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of
the Secret Search, 40 NO. 2 CRIM. LAW BULL. ART 1 (Summer 2004).
230
Davies, supra note 114, at 557.
231
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (quoting Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). The Court re-affirmed this statement in Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
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pects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared
to recognize as justifiable.”232 As such, without a warrant, the government cannot use surveillance devices to determine whether or
not a particular item, like a cell phone, or a person, is in a private
residence.233 The “[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property [within
one’s home] . . . present[s] far too serious a threat to privacy interests . . . to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.”234
It does not matter that law enforcement agencies will not know
when they are monitoring devices in a private place, thus compelling them to obtain a warrant in almost all cases.235 Nor does it matter that they may not be able to depict the “place” they are trying
to search, because the location is what they are after.236 This perfectly articulates why the use of a Stingray would intrude on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in nearly all situations. Law
enforcement typically uses Stingrays to find suspects whose locations they do not know, and therefore may track them into private
places.237 As a result, law enforcement must be required to obtain a
warrant prior to its use of a Stingray or risk violating the Fourth
Amendment. The federal government admitted as much in a failed
defense in Karo.238
This potential for an invasion of privacy has only increased with
the advance of technology and when new technologies come before
a court they are typically analyzed through a Kyllo analysis.239 Applying such an analysis to Stingrays supports the inference that
Stingrays, like thermal imaging devices, should also be found to be
232

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
Id. at 716.
234
Id.
235
See id. at 718.
236
Id.
237
See text accompanying supra note 30.
238
The federal government argued in Karo that requiring a warrant prior to monitoring
a beeper in a private residence would require them to obtain a warrant in almost all
situations. Karo, 468 U.S. at 718. Since the location is precisely what agents are after, it is
impossible for agents to predict whether the beeper will be at some point transmitting its
signals from inside private premises. See id.; supra note 167 and accompanying text.
239
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
233
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a search under the Fourth Amendment. A main concern of the
Court in Kyllo was protecting the home from “advancing technology.”240 This is why even a mere inference from the use of technology that produces information on the interior of a home is still considered a search.241 Therefore, use of a Stingray that goes through
walls to produce information on the interior of a home, such information being an inference that the suspect will be in the home next
to his cell phone,242 should surely be found to be a search as well.243
The fact that the information produced is only an inference is immaterial.244 Nor does it matter that the information produced is
merely the location of a cell phone—if a phonograph table, a can of
ether, and how warm a house is are considered intimate details of a
home,245 the location of a cell phone within a home is assuredly an
intimate detail as well.
As for the criticisms of Kyllo concerning the “general public
use” standard and the potential for the category of “senseenhancing technology” that is covered by the new rule being too
broad,246 they do not present much of a problem in regards to Stingrays. Stingrays cannot be considered in general public use because
the public barely knows anything about them and are actively pre240

See id. at 35–36, 40.
See id. at 36.
242
See, e.g., Matthew Keys, Sting Operation: Police Tracked Cellphones with ‘Stingrays,’
BLOT MAG. (June 5, 2014), http://www.theblot.com/documents-reveal-police-track-cellphones-stingrays-7720535 [https://perma.cc/YV6H-Z2BF] (reporting that the police
used a Stingray to find and force themselves into a suspect’s apartment without a
warrant); Kim Zetter, Secrets of FBI Smartphone Surveillance Tool Revealed in Court Fight,
WIRED (Apr. 9, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/04/verizon-rigmaidenaircard/ [https://perma.cc/5B66-ZLFC] (reporting that the FBI used a Stingray to find
the suspect in apartment 1122).
243
A potential counter is that the agents will have “probable cause to believe that
incriminating evidence will be found within” the home, such as a wanted suspect. Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588 (1980). The Court shot down this argument because “the
constitutional protection afforded to the individual’s interest in the privacy of his own
home is equally applicable to a warrantless entry for the purpose of arresting a resident of
the house; for it is inherent in such an entry that a search for the suspect may be required
before he can be apprehended.” Id.
244
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36.
245
See text accompanying supra notes 217–18.
246
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting); text accompanying supra notes
220, 224.
241
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vented from learning more.247 Additionally, only sixty-one state
and federal agencies are known to use Stingrays248 as compared to
the thermal imaging device at issue in Kyllo, which had nearly one
thousand manufactured units.249 On top of that, the device in Kyllo
could be rented by anyone who wanted one from several national
companies, was predated by a device which had anywhere from
4,000 to 5,000 units, and had a competitor ranging from 5,000 to
6,000 units.250 If the device in Kyllo was found to not be in general
public use, then clearly Stingrays are in even less general public
use.
Were Stingrays to get to a point that they could arguably be
considered in general public use, then courts may finally be forced
to address this language. Federal courts have been reluctant to analyze what constitutes “general public use” so far,251 while states
may avoid the question altogether by formulating their own standards based upon their state constitutions.252 Relying upon the
more protective terms of their own constitutions, states may instead decide on the issue by relying upon a privacy analysis that
does not incorporate the objective expectations of society into it,253
or simply leave out the general public use language in a similar
adoption of Kyllo. As for the federal courts, the blind affirmation of
the public use standard needs to come to an end.254 Whatever options the lower courts select in providing meaning to the language
“will ultimately and inevitably lead to further consideration by the
Supreme Court regarding this question,”255 but until then, district
courts need to attempt to provide clarification.
247

See supra Section I.A.
See Who’s Got Them, supra note 3.
249
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250
Id.
251
See Conom, supra note 222, at 765.
252
See id. at 766; see also State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (Wash. 1994) (“We hold the
infrared surveillance not only violated the defendant’s private affairs, but also constituted
a violation of the Washington State Constitution’s protection against the warrantless
invasion of his home.”).
253
Conom, supra note 222, at 773. “In Young, the Washington Supreme Court found
both the private affairs clause and invasion of the home clause [of their state constitution]
violated.” Id. at 768.
254
See Conom, supra note 222, at 773.
255
Id.
248
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As to the second criticism of Kyllo, that the standard was far
too broad,256 its concern is unfounded here relying upon the reasoning laid out in Illinois v. Caballes.257 Simply having a cell phone
on your person is lawful activity258 and very different than a dog
sniff or any other future surveillance technique that is only capable
of procuring unlawful activity. Therefore, because a Stingray is not
in general public use at the moment and it detects legal activity,
when the use of one produces information inside a private residence that was not knowable without the use of the device, in that
instance it should be considered a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Much of this line of analysis is confirmed and supplemented by GPS tracking cases.
2. Tracking People in Public Areas with Stingrays is Also a
Search
Looking at the real-time tracking cases259 together provides
another useful indicator on how courts could analyze the use of
Stingrays if they were to accept the opportunity. First, it appears a
court would apply a Katz analysis because Stingrays involve no
physical trespass but an electronic one.260 If the use of a Stingray is
found to have procured information from inside a private residence, that ends the analysis because the Fourth Amendment protects one’s home.261 It does not matter that electronic surveillance
is less intrusive than traditional means—the Fourth Amendment
protects the information a search reveals inside a home and a court
cannot abandon the notion of being free from government intrusion
just because a search is less intrusive.262
256

See text accompanying supra note 224.
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409–10 (1983); supra text accompanying notes
226–28.
258
“[N]early three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of their
phones most of the time . . . .” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014); see also
Lee Rainie & Kathryn Zickuhr, Americans’ Views on Mobile Etiquette, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug.
26,
2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/26/americans-views-on-mobileetiquette/ [https://perma.cc/D6KK-AUQ5].
259
See supra Part II.C.
260
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
261
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
262
See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (“The monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper
is, of course, less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact about
257
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If the search never intruded into a private place, which is very
unlikely as the average American spends sixty nine percent of his or
her time in a residence,263 a court will likely then ask whether the
surveillance done by the Stingray could have reasonably been done
through traditional, visual surveillance as a way to determine the
reasonableness of the search.264 With a Stingray, the user is often
trying to find a suspect’s location. That means law enforcement
does not have a car to place a tracking device on nor the means to
conduct traditional surveillance methods, such as tracking the car
by simply following it. Therefore, even if a suspect is tracked in and
to public places, the tracking was only made possible through the
use of the Stingray and should still be considered an illegal search.
Such tracking of people in public places also impinges on expectations of privacy under the mosaic theory. Since Stingrays allow for the continuous, precise tracking of a person, it is, therefore,
a very real concern that law enforcement may use a Stingray to obtain an aggregate of information that paints an intimate portrait of a
person’s life. When law enforcement uses a Stingray to follow an
individual, whose cell phone number they do not have, to various
locations in order to determine the targeted individual’s number,
the police create a powerful social and behavioral analysis map that
will not only reveal the intimate details of the targeted person but
also of innocent people who live and interact around those loca-

the interior of the premises that the government is extremely interested in knowing and
that it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant.”).
263
See Neil E. Klepeis et al., The National Human Activity Pattern Survey (NHAPS): A
Resource for Assessing Exposure to Environmental Pollutants, 11 J. OF EXPOSURE ANALYSIS
AND ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 231, 239 (2001), http://www.nature.com/jes/journal/v11/
n3/pdf/7500165a.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN9E-VVVQ].
264
Even though the majority in Jones did not employ such a technique, the opinion did
indicate were they to have employed a Katz analysis, they would have looked at whether
the electronic surveillance could have been done through traditional means. See Jones, 132
S. Ct. at 953–54 (“Thus, even assuming that the concurrence is correct to say that
‘[t]raditional surveillance’ of Jones for a four-week period ‘would have required a large
team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,’ our cases suggest that
such visual observation is constitutionally permissible. It may be that achieving the same
result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer
that question.” (internal citations omitted)).
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tions.265 One U.S. Magistrate Judge has already taken note of this
issue and has prohibited federal agents from using Stingrays when
“an inordinate number of innocent third parties’ information will
be collected.”266 Judge Iain Johnston stated the devices are “simply too powerful” and invasive “to allow its use without specific authorization from a fully informed court.”267
In the scenarios where the police are tracking an individual
whose cell phone number they do have, the mosaic theory may not
be as applicable because law enforcement will presumably not track
them for as long and, therefore, not obtain as much information.
Nonetheless, the concern remains that law enforcement may give
in to the temptation to use a Stingray because of how easy it makes
the tracking of suspects, resulting in “abuse, overreach, or misuse”
by law enforcement.268 This potential abuse of authority by law enforcement is the twenty-first century version of the fear that the
Framers had and why they wanted to curb the discretionary authority of officers.269 Additionally, the public does not agree that the
length of the tracking should be the decisive factor in deciding a
reasonable expectation of privacy on the real-time tracking of an
individual’s cell phone.270 Society is prepared to recognize that the
short term tracking of a person’s location is a violation as well.
B. A Traditional Katz Analysis
This Part conducts a traditional Katz analysis of the use of
Stingray devices. It argues first that society is prepared to recognize
an expectation of privacy in real-time cell phone location data, and
second that people actually have such an expectation.
265

See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION MICH., A TASTE OF ITS OWN MEDICINE: MICHIGAN
HOLDS FIRST PUBLIC HEARING ON SECRETIVE HAILSTORM AND STINGRAY SURVEILLANCE
DEVICES 3 (2014), http://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/ATasteOfItsOwn
Medicine_Hailstorm_Stingray_Surveillance_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZKK-D94E]
[hereinafter ACLU Michigan Stingray Report].
266
In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Relating to
Telephones Used by Suppressed, No. 15 M 0021, 2015 WL 6871289, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
9, 2015) [hereinafter Cell-Site Simulator Use Order].
267
Id. at *4.
268
ACLU Michigan Stingray Report, supra note 265, at 3.
269
See Davies, supra note 114, at 578.
270
See text accompanying infra note 280.
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1. People Have an Objective Expectation of Privacy in Their
Real-Time Cell Phone Location Data
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz requires that for Fourth
Amendment protection an expectation of privacy must “be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”271 Therefore, we must determine if society is prepared to recognize the realtime tracking of a person’s location through his cell phone (i.e., use
of a Stingray) as reasonable or to be a violation of that person’s expectation of privacy.
The Supreme Court recognizes that society is concerned about
the government’s increasing use of electronic surveillance.272 Ninety-two percent of Americans own cell phones and ninety percent of
those users say their phone is frequently with them273—meaning
law enforcement could track eighty-three percent of Americans
with a Stingray on a daily basis if they wanted to. Forty-six percent
of smartphone users say they couldn’t live without their phones.274
The Court recognizes that:
Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they . . . may reveal, they
hold for many Americans “the privacies of life.”
The fact that technology now allows an individual to
carry such information in his hand does not make
the information any less worthy of the protection for
which the Founders fought.275
The Court has already found that there is an expectation of privacy in telephone conversations conducted in public phone

271

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Awareness that the
Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”); United
States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972) (stating
that the employment of electronic surveillance by government causes “a deep-seated
uneasiness and apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude upon the
cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens”).
273
See Rainie & Zickuhr, supra note 258.
274
See Monica Anderson, 6 Facts About Americans and Their Smartphones, PEW RES.
CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/01/6-facts-aboutamericans-and-their-smartphones/ [https://perma.cc/45GY-4QBD].
275
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
272

2016]

REAL-TIME TRACKING OF CELL PHONES

1039

booths276 and the Sixth Circuit, relying upon principles laid out in
Katz, found a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails as well.277
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that “the Fourth Amendment
must keep pace with the inexorable march of technological
progress, or its guarantees will wither and perish.”278 The use of
Stingrays is precisely the kind of situation where the Fourth
Amendment must keep pace with technology or we risk losing its
protection altogether. Therefore, there needs to be a recognition of
an objective expectation of privacy in real-time cell phone location
data, especially when obtained through surveillance techniques that
could not have been conducted without the use of the device.
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones suggests that such an expectation will only be reasonable if it is over a long period of time
because the duration of the tracking is the decisive factor.279 The
public simply does not agree with this opinion. In a study about
Americans’ privacy expectations, the results show that the percentage of respondents who believed that surveillance either definitely
or likely violated a reasonable expectation of privacy rose by just
three percentage points when the surveillance’s duration was described as month-long rather than day-long.280 Therefore, the relative short term tracking that may occur with the typical use of a
Stingray should not be of a concern to a court. People are just as
worried about their location being tracked for a day as they are for a
month.

276

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (majority opinion).
See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 289 (6th Cir. 2010).
278
Id. at 285.
279
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment) (“[R]elatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public
streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as
reasonable.”).
280
Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Surveillance Duration Doesn’t Affect
Privacy Expectations: An Empirical Test of the Mosaic Theory 6 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law
& Econ., Working Paper No. 727, 2015), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=2419&context=law_and_economics
[https://perma.cc/Q2KH5ERD]. The results went from 56% to 59% who believed tracking through GPS
surveillance would definitely or likely violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, with
25% and 24% respectively believing such tracking definitely or likely did not violate a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 34.
277
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2. People Have a Subjective Expectation of Privacy in Their
Real-Time Cell Phone Location Data
In order to constitute a search under Harlan’s concurrence in
Katz, a person must exhibit an actual or subjective expectation of
privacy as well.281 Citizens are right to, and in fact do, assume that
their belongings “are not infected with concealed electronic devices.”282 This is precisely what a Stingray does though; it secretly
forces a user’s phone to connect to it and then gathers the information and location of the phone. Statistics support this inference as
well—that people have an actual expectation of privacy in their
phones and location.
In a 2014 survey, 82% of people considered their physical location to be sensitive material.283 In a separate survey, 85.5% of respondents disagreed with Knotts, in which the Supreme Court
upheld the warrantless installation of a tracking device on a vehicle.284 Lastly, in a poll of Californians, 73% of the people favored
“a law that required the police to convince a judge that a crime has
been committed before obtaining location information from the cell
phone company.”285 All of this indicates people have an actual expectation of privacy in their location and cell phones, despite what
the Eleventh Circuit said in Davis.

281

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 735 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
283
See MARY MADDEN, PEW RES. CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND
SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 34 (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/
2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4Y6-6EE4]
(noting that fifty percent of adults feel that their physical location data is “very sensitive”
and that another thirty-two percent of adults consider this data “somewhat sensitive”).
284
See Henry F. Fradella, et al., Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring “Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy” in the Fourth Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 366
(2011).
285
See Jennifer King & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Supermajority of Californians Supports
Limits on Law Enforcement Access to Cell Location Information 8–9 (Apr. 18, 2008),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/beyond-voicemapping-mobile-marketplace-534331-00005/534331-00005.pdf [https://perma.cc/49J75QM5].
282
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C. The Use of a Stingray is Different from the Acquisition of Historical
Cell Tower Records
The overarching difference between the Eleventh Circuit decision in Davis and the use of a Stingray is that when law enforcement uses a Stingray, they are not obtaining historical location data
but instead are tracking cell phones in real-time. The Davis court
specifically mentioned that this case does not involve “real-time or
prospective cell tower location information.”286 While historical
cell site location data only shows the user’s “general vicinity,”287
the tracking with a Stingray is precise. When looking at the step-bystep analysis taken by the Davis court, it only further illustrates the
differences between historical and real-time cell phone location data.
The court’s first consideration in Davis was that cell phone users have no expectation of privacy in their historical cell site locations under the third party doctrine because cell phone users know
when making a call that their phone has to connect to a cell
tower.288 This changes with the use of a Stingray. When a Stingray
is being used, a cell phone no longer connects to a cell tower but
instead connects to the Stingray without alerting the user. The Davis court also identified that cell phones only emit such a signal
when a person makes or receives a call.289 This too changes when
law enforcement uses a Stingray, as the device forces a connection
with the phone even if no call is in progress.
The third consideration in Davis was that people know their
phone’s signal is sent to their service provider.290 As just mentioned, with a Stingray the phone’s signal is no longer being sent to
a user’s service provider but instead to the Stingray device unknowingly. In its final step, the Davis court determined that the cell
phone user is aware that he is conveying cell tower location information to the service provider, and voluntarily does so.291 In contrast, when a Stingray is in use, the cell phone user is not aware
286
287
288
289
290
291

See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 505 (11th Cir. 2015).
See id. at 516.
See id. at 511.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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that he is conveying his location to the Stingray device, nor is he
voluntarily sending a cell signal to it at all; the Stingray forces the
connection. Therefore, the third party doctrine that is so heavily
relied upon in Davis is not applicable to Stingrays.
D. Approval to Use a Stingray May Constitute a General Warrant
In determining whether a particular government action violates
the Fourth Amendment, a court is first to inquire “whether the
action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the
common law when the Amendment was framed.”292 The Fourth
Amendment prohibits general warrants.293 The problem with general warrants is not necessarily of an intrusion, but of “a general,
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”294 This is exactly what the Framers were concerned with when writing the Fourth
Amendment and is addressed by the Amendments’ particularity
requirement.295
This would seem to suggest that Stingrays are in direct conflict
with the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment because they
gather information from every cell phone within their range,
whether or not there is a warrant for each phone it forces a connection with.296 The particularity requirement requires a warrant to
describe the person and things to be searched297 but this simply is
292

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999).
See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
294
Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971)).
295
See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.” (emphasis added)).
296
See Frank Knaack, Stingrays—Bringing Dragnet Surveillance to a Town Near You, AM.
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION VA. (Sept. 26, 2014, 4:13 PM), https://acluva.org/16123/stingraysbringing-dragnet-surveillance-to-a-town-near-you/ [https://perma.cc/VRL4-8EZ5]. This
article also suggests that use of a Stingray should be banned all together because of First
Amendment concerns as well. Id. While the Supreme Court held in NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), that the government “cannot force a private
association to turn over its membership list to the government, the introduction of
Stingrays has provided law enforcement with a tool to get around this constitutional
limitation.” Knaack, supra. Law enforcement can stand near a meeting and collect
information and identities from all nearby phones. Id.
297
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
293
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not possible because of the fact that a Stingray searches every
phone near it, not just of the person or thing law enforcement described in the warrant, were law enforcement to obtain one.298
However, one problem with this historical approach is that between the 1990 and 2001 terms, the Supreme Court ruled on twenty cases addressing the Fourth Amendment, yet only discussed the
original meaning of the Amendment in four of these cases—
suggesting they do not always begin with a historical analysis.299 A
second problem is that modern judges have struggled “in recounting the content of framing-era law.”300 Nonetheless, a historical
argument of the Fourth Amendment is one to consider when discussing the possibility that approval to use a Stingray may constitute an illegal general warrant.
Even if you were not to base an analysis on the historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment, at the core of the Amendment
is the right for any person to be free from governmental intrusion in
his own home.301 No warrant would allow the police to search every
house in a neighborhood, but a Stingray allows the police to do just
that.302 Police can use a Stingray to search “every home, vehicle,
purse and pocket in a given area,”303 meaning that tens of thousands of innocent bystanders can potentially have information from
their phones taken by law enforcement without anyone being the
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See Knaack, supra note 296.
Seltzer, supra note 229.
300
Davies, supra note 114, at 742 (“Justice Scalia repeated Chief Justice Taft’s
historically false claim that the allowance of warrantless ship searches in the 1789
Collections Act revealed the Framers’ understanding of the Fourth Amendment’s
‘reasonableness’ standard. Likewise, Justice Thomas has recently mischaracterized a
statement by Blackstone as though it were relevant to the knock-and-announce rule for
serving warrants.”).
301
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 589–90 (1980).
302
See Fenton, supra note 106; see also Tim Cushing, Baltimore PD Hides Its Stingray
Usage Under a Pen Register Order; Argues There’s Really No Difference Between The Two,
TECHDIRT (Jan. 9, 2015, 6:10 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150103/
14461029590/baltimore-pd-hides-its-stingray-usage-under-pen-register-order-arguestheres-really-no-difference-between-two.shtml [https://perma.cc/FR9N-LH8C] (noting
that since a Stingray searches the phones of anyone in the vicinity, a warrant to use such a
device at the very least is an illegal general search warrant).
303
Fenton, supra note 106.
299

1044

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVI:995

wiser.304 The fact that such a sweep may only pick up the identifying information of bystanders’ cell phones does not matter because
chances are that some of those bystanders will be in their homes,
and all details in the home are intimate.
Additionally, there is a concern that the federal government
will collect these innocent bystanders’ numbers and then maintain
those numbers in a database.305 Such third party bystanders have
greater privacy interests and are provided with more safeguards
from the courts than litigants though.306 In order to address this
issue, one judge has limited the use of Stingrays, and in some situations banned their use altogether.307 Therefore, while it may be unlikely that the use of a Stingray will be banned in all situations, they
may be banned in certain situations on the basis that they are “fundamentally at odds with the Constitution.”308
The legality of dragnet surveillance was recently looked at in
American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper.309 In this case, the ACLU
challenged the legality of the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”)
telephone metadata310 collection program,311 arguing that the col304

See Lisa Bartley, Investigation: Law Enforcement Use Secret ‘Stingray’ Devices to Track
Cell Phone Signals, ABC7 (Dec. 3, 2014), http://abc7.com/news/investigation-lawenforcement-use-secret-devices-to-track-cell-phone-signals/421190/
[https://perma.cc/M6N8-YQA9].
305
See Cell-Site Simulator Use Order, supra note 266, at *3.
306
Id.
307
Id. at *3–4.
308
See Knaack, supra note 296.
309
See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d. Cir. 2015).
310
Telephone metadata are:
[D]etails about telephone calls, including, for example, the length of a
call, the phone number from which the call was made, and the phone
number called. Metadata can also reveal the user or device making or
receiving a call through unique “identity numbers” associated with
the equipment . . . and provide information about the routing of a call
through the telephone network, which can sometimes (although not
always) convey information about a caller’s general location.
According to the government, the metadata it collected did not
include cell site locational information, which provides a more precise
indication of a caller’s location than call-routing information does.
Id. at 793–94.
311
In this program, the NSA “collect[ed] in bulk ‘on an ongoing daily basis’ the
metadata associated with telephone calls made by and to Americans, and aggregated those
metadata into a repository or data bank that can later be queried.” Id. at 792.
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lection program violated the Fourth Amendment.312 The Second
Circuit found that the language of section 215 of the PATRIOT Act
did not authorize the program.313 The court noted that the program
was “shrouded in . . . secrecy . . . and only a limited subset of
members of Congress had a comprehensive understanding of the
program or of its purported legal bases.”314 Since there was “no
opportunity for broad discussion in the Congress or among the
public of whether the [federal government]’s interpretation of section 215 was correct,” the program was not legislatively ratified.315
Once the Second Circuit found the program to be illegal on statutory grounds, it did not rule on the constitutional issues.316
One issue with using Clapper as a corollary to Stingray use is
that Clapper involved the authorization of the collection of data
from millions of people in the interest of national security and
counter-terrorism,317 while Stingrays are typically used by state
agencies to track anyone from killers to petty thieves and involve
the alleged searches of tens of thousands of people, not millions.
These are very different interests to be balanced by a court in
weighing a person’s reasonable Fourth Amendment interests
against the legitimate interests of the government.
Nonetheless, the argument made by the ACLU in Clapper318
provides an interesting theory and convinced the court to admit, in
312
313
314
315
316
317
318

See id. at 810.
See id. at 818.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 821.
See id. at 824.
See generally id.
Appellants argue that the telephone metadata program provides an
archetypal example of the kind of technologically advanced
surveillance techniques that, they contend, require a revision of the
third-party records doctrine. Metadata today, as applied to individual
telephone subscribers, particularly with relation to mobile phone
services and when collected on an ongoing basis with respect to all of
an individual’s calls (and not merely, as in traditional criminal
investigations, for a limited period connected to the investigation of a
particular crime), permit something akin to the 24–hour surveillance
that worried some of the Court in Jones. Moreover, the bulk
collection of data as to essentially the entire population of the United
States, something inconceivable before the advent of high-speed
computers, permits the development of a government database with a
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dicta, that the seriousness of the constitutional concerns raised had
some bearing on what they held.319 The court stated that the legislative process should serve the primary role “in deciding, explicitly
and after full debate, whether such programs are appropriate and
necessary. Ideally, such issues should be resolved by the courts only after such debate, with due respect for any conclusions reached
by the coordinate branches of government.”320 This notion was
confirmed when Congress subsequently amended the language of
section 215 to create a 180-day transition period, which the Second
Circuit upheld.321 The court again declined to consider whether
bulk collection of metadata violates the Fourth Amendment on the
grounds that the transition period will soon expire and any violation of Fourth Amendment rights will be “temporary.”322 This
suggests that legislators should be the ones to resolve the use of
Stingrays as well.
IV. STATE LEGISLATORS NEED TO PROVIDE STATUTORY
GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF STINGRAYS AND IF THEY DO
NOT, COURTS SHOULD RULE ON THEM INSTEAD
As suggested in Clapper and elsewhere, in circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy
concerns are likely legislative.323 Like the DOJ, DHS, Washington,
potential for invasions of privacy unimaginable in the past. Thus,
appellants argue, the program cannot simply be sustained on the
reasoning that permits the government to obtain, for a limited period
of time as applied to persons suspected of wrongdoing, a simple
record of the phone numbers contained in their service providers’
billing records.
Id. at 824.
319
See id.
320
See id. at 825.
321
See ACLU v. Clapper, 804 F.3d 617, 618 (2d Cir. 2015).
322
Id. at 626.
323
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment) (“A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw
detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”); United
States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 520 (11th Cir. 2015) (“If the rapid development of
technology has any implications for our interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, it
militates in favor of judicial caution, because Congress, not the judiciary, has the
institutional competence to evaluate complex and evolving technologies.”).
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Utah, Virginia, California, and Minnesota, states and agencies need
to implement their own guidelines or legislation on the use of Stingrays.
The remaining states should look to follow California’s template and provide statutory guidance on the use of Stingrays. The
California Electronic Communications Privacy Act is “the most
comprehensive digital privacy law in the nation.”324 It ensures that
law enforcement is granted a warrant prior to:
[Obtaining] access to electronic information about
who we are, where we go, who we know, and what
we do. It requires a probable cause warrant for all
digital content, location information, metadata, and
access to devices like cell phones. The law’s notice
and enforcement provisions make sure that there is
proper oversight and mechanisms to ensure that the
law is followed . . . [and] still includes appropriate
exceptions to ensure that the police can continue to
effectively and efficiently protect public safety.325
While a legislative call to action across federal and state governments may be the ideal solution, it is not going to happen overnight, and courts need to provide a solution in the meantime.
Therefore, when the use of a Stingray comes before a court, and
where there is no statutory guidance in place, courts need to step in
and decide whether evidence obtained as a result of Stingray use
should be suppressed.326 If courts are not allowed or choose not to
324

California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA)—SB 178, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION N. CAL., https://www.aclunc.org/our-work/legislation/calecpa
[https://perma.cc/VZ79-ZRHQ] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016) [hereinafter ACLU on
CalECPA].
325
Id. Most importantly, the Act has an exception for “an emergency involving danger
of death or serious physical injury to any person.” S.B. 178, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess.
§ 1546.1(c)(5) (Cal. 2015), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml
?bill_id=201520160SB178 [https://perma.cc/G43J-HEZ9].
326
See Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance,
Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843, 898 (2014); see
also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
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step in, the government essentially has total control over the legality of Stingray use with no oversight by acting as judge and jury on
their use behind closed doors.327
Courts can and should step in to rule upon new investigative
methods, as the legality of searches is significant for both defendants and society as a whole.328 The protection provided by the
courts “is one of the few ways in which the law can keep up with
rapidly evolving technologies [when the legislators have declined to
do so]—like the wiretapping in Katz, the thermal imaging in Kyllo,
the GPS tracking in Jones, or the NSA’s bulk collection of phone
records today.”329 Thus, to allow the government to continue to
hold unilateral control over the legality of Stingrays by withholding
its use from the courts would clearly be detrimental to the privacy
interests of society.330
Were a court given the chance to rule on the legality of a Stingray under the Fourth Amendment, the court should look to Clapper for guidance. Despite the Second Circuit not ruling on the
Fourth Amendment issue (and the differences between the NSA
data collection program and Stingrays), the court still made use of
general doctrinal principles relevant to modern warrantless
searches under the Fourth Amendment.331 In discussing the Fourth
Amendment implications of the case, the Clapper court made reference to the concern of “dragnet” surveillance in Knotts, the
“mosaic” of information revealed through the surveillance in
Jones, and that five of the Justices in Jones were suggesting that
“there might be a Fourth Amendment violation even without the
technical trespass upon which the majority opinion relied.”332

competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime . . . . When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not
by a policeman or Government enforcement agent.”).
327
See Toomey & Kaufman, supra note 326, at 898.
328
See id. at 898–99.
329
See id. at 899.
330
See id.
331
ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 822 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Appellants’ argument invokes
one of the most difficult issues in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the extent to which
modern technology alters our traditional expectations of privacy.”).
332
See id. at 823.
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It was argued that the telephone metadata program provided
“an archetypal example of the kind of technologically advanced
surveillance techniques that . . . require a revision of the third-party
records doctrine.”333 As discussed previously, such a revision to
the third party doctrine is not necessary to find Stingray use illegal
under the Fourth Amendment.334 Therefore, despite the fact that
Stingrays do not invade upon the privacies of millions of people like
the surveillance program in Clapper, they do conduct a sort of invasion of privacy that, as with the NSA’s data collection program,
was “unimaginable in the past.”335 If guidelines on the use of Stingrays are not going to be put forth by legislators in all jurisdictions,
courts need to formulate their own guidelines on the use of Stingrays in order to protect the public’s Fourth Amendment interests.336
CONCLUSION
The public should not be forced to sacrifice the modern convenience—some would even say necessity—of a cell phone in favor
of privacy. The practice of tracking suspects of petty crime with
Stingrays obtained through federal anti-terror grants needs to stop.
Currently, those people found through the use of Stingrays have no
idea such a device was used to find them, thereby leaving the opportunity to challenge that search within government control. Such
a unilateral control over society’s privacy interests is untenable.
The real-time tracking of cell phone location data through a Stingray is illegal without a warrant and courts need to be given the opportunity to make such a ruling if legislators everywhere are not
going to proactively implement their own statutory guidance on
Stingrays.
333

See id. at 824.
See supra Section III.C.
335
See Clapper, 785 F.3d at 824.
336
The Seventh Circuit has finally taken up the issue in United States v. Patrick and will
examine the Fourth Amendment implications of Stingray use. See Cyrus Farivar,
Warrantless Stingray Case Finally Arrives Before Federal Appellate Judges, ARSTECHNICA
(Jan. 29, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/01/warrantlessstingray-case-finally-arrives-before-federal-appellate-judges/ [https://perma.cc/JHE54J2T]. In this case, Damian Patrick was located in a car by the Milwaukee Police
Department, with strong evidence he was located through the use of a Stingray. Id. This
case should finally provide some clarity to the warrantless use of Stingrays.
334

